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1 Introduction
Numerous studies find that, on average, women under-perform (e.g., Niederle, 2014) and
exhibit more risk aversion in competitive situations (e.g., Byrnes et al., 1999). Persistent
social phenomena, such as the gender wage gap (Goldin, 2014) or excessive risk-taking
(Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015), have been explained by such gender differences. But are
these female-male disparities gender-inherent or do they only arise under specific circum-
stances? One hypothesis suggests that the gender of opponents can influence women’s
performance and risk attitudes (Booth et al., 2014). In the following pages, we analyze
8,169 contestants of the popular US game show Jeopardy! to test whether the opponents’
gender indeed affects women’s behavior in highly competitive situations. Contrary to pre-
vious studies with much smaller sample sizes, our results suggest that gender differences
disappear once a woman competes against males only.
The idea that the gender of one’s opponents affects behavior in general – and perfor-
mance in particular – carries vital implications in a number of policy-relevant settings. For
example, the debate over single- versus mixed-gender classes remains a persistent topic
in the literature surrounding educational structures (Jackson, 2012; Park et al., 2013).
Recently, this argument has again been the subject of heavy discussion in the UK.1 Sim-
ilarly, numerous work environments tend to be dominated by one gender, such as the
finance industry or executive positions.2 Especially in the finance industry, which re-
mains a male-dominated domain, a distinctive degree of risk-taking may have contributed
to the formation of the global financial crisis in 2007/08 (Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015).
Unfortunately, analyzing potential effects of the opponents’ gender on women’s per-
formance in competitive situations has been challenging. In real life, workers are likely to
self-select into a desired gender environment, which can introduce a non-trivial endogene-
1For example, see articles in The Telegraph (Boult, 2016; Turner and de Normann, 2016), The Guardian
(Lott-Lavigna, 2016), or the Cambridge News (Cambridge News, 2016) for different opinions.
2See Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015) for the share of women in finance; Bertrand and Hallock (2001)
point out that only 2.5 percent of executive positions in the United States have been filled with women.
Similarly, the share of females in IT- and math-related occupations remains low, sometimes less than 20
percent, as highlighted by the US Department of Labor (DoL, 2016).
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ity bias when regressing performance indicators on variables that capture the opponents’
gender. Further, individual outcomes are difficult to observe and isolate in most occupa-
tions. As a response, researchers have largely turned to experimental studies. Although
causality can be isolated more effectively in laboratory experiments, these studies usu-
ally rely on fewer observations and the generalizability of results remains a concern (e.g.
Levitt and List, 2007; Niederle, 2014; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).
We analyze a real-life situation where people are assigned male or female opponents,
using information from the performance of 8,169 Jeopardy! contestants in 749,433 obser-
vations. Contestants have no control over whether they compete against a) two females,
b) one female and one male, or c) two males. We evaluate whether the gender of the oppo-
sition affects women’s probabilities to (i) respond, (ii) respond correctly, and (iii) respond
correctly in particularly high-stakes Daily Double clues. Further, we test whether the gen-
der of women’s opponents influences wagering decisions in Daily Double opportunities. As
prize money averages US$20,648 (in 2015 US$) per episode, incentives are substantial and
players are likely to reveal their true competitive behavior.3 In additional estimations, we
also analyzed the effect of gender on men’s performance, but the corresponding results
are generally not statistically significant and no clear pattern emerges.
To relate our setup to the closest findings in the literature, Table 1 summarizes some
of the most recent works discussing gender differences in competitive behavior and risk
preferences. By no means do we claim this list to be complete, but it illustrates some
notable insights. Most importantly, the majority of studies have been experimental with
sample sizes ranging from less than 100 to about 500 and payoff structures markedly lower
than in Jeopardy!.
Beginning with competitive situations, the corresponding results establish the notion
that women are, on average, under-performing in competition and less likely to select into
competitive situations (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Potential explanations relate to
3These monetary incentives compare well to an experiment conducted by Ariely et al. (2009) in
India, who emphasize large stakes. The prize for the winner of an average Jeopardy! episode equals
approximately 40 percent of GDP per capita in the US. The median payoff amounts to US$19,752,

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the task at hand (Shurchkov, 2012; Gu¨nther et al., 2010), the time given to learn (Cotton
et al., 2013; Shurchkov, 2012), or team versus individual competition formats (Healy and
Pate, 2011). Note that several non-experimental studies listed here find no remarkable
gender differences in competitive behavior (Lavy, 2013; Jetter and Walker, 2015), contrary
to most laboratory settings. Similarly, the results from our study reveal no statistically
significant gender differences in competitive situations. However, we do find substantial
differences when distinguishing by gender of the opposition: a woman performs equally
to men only when competing against males. Otherwise, she under-performs.
Concerning risk preferences, competing against men has usually been found to discour-
age risk-taking by females (Booth and Nolen, 2012b; Booth et al., 2014), as summarized
in Panel B of Table 1. Our findings stand in stark contrast to these results, indicating
that a woman exhibits the same risk preferences as a man when competing against males.
In the presence of other women, however, females play much more conservatively and
wager significantly less in Daily Double clues. In terms of magnitude, our most complete
estimation suggests women to wager 3.3 percentage points less than men when competing
against other females. In contrast, she wagers 0.4 percentage points more than a man
when competing against two males. It is important to highlight that our results remain
remarkably consistent after the inclusion of a comprehensive set of control variables, such
as her previous Jeopardy! performance or the nature and category of the clue.
Finally, incorporating player fixed effects, therefore exploiting within-player dynamics
only, confirms our findings and, if anything, the corresponding quantitative interpretation
becomes stronger. The same female contestant performs better and wagers significantly
more when competing against two males, as opposed to playing against at least one female.
Our results carry implications for several streams of literature and policy areas. First,
work environments dominated by females may produce under-performance in high-stakes
competitive situations. Second, increasing the share of women in male-dominated oc-
cupations, such as the finance industry, may not necessarily alter the overall degree of
risk-taking, as suggested by Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015). One woman in an all-male en-
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vironment may simply assimilate to the males’ behavior. By design, our study is limited
to analyzing three contestants and further studies may be needed to evaluate at which
gender-ratio of competitors behavioral differences emerge. Third, our findings contribute
to the debate about nature versus nurture, implying that differences in competitive be-
havior are driven by surrounding characteristics (the gender of opponents), rather than
being gender-inherent. This may favor the general concept of “social learning” over in-
herent gender differences in explaining gender differences in competitive situations and
risk preferences, as described by Booth and Nolen (2012b).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature,
in addition to a detailed description of Jeopardy!. Section 3 presents our sample data and
describes our empirical methodology. In Section 4, we describe our findings. Section 5
places our findings in context to the existing literature. Finally, Section 6 concludes with
policy implications of our findings.
2 Background
This section provides a brief summary of the literature surrounding gender differences in
competitive behavior and risk preferences, focusing on the importance of the opponents’
gender. Given the large extent of these literatures, we restrict ourselves to the most
prominent and recent contributions. Finally, we discuss the structure and history of
Jeopardy! to illustrate how this setting is particularly well suited to study the effect of
gender composition on performance indicators.
2.1 Gender Differences in Competitive Behavior
In a seminal paper, Gneezy et al. (2003) show females to be less effective than males in
competitive environments. Their results imply that raising the degree of competitiveness
leads to an improvement in men’s performance, but not in women’s. In related studies,
Gneezy and Rustichini (2004), Niederle and Vesterlund (2010), and Reuben et al. (2015),
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among others, find girls and women to under-perform in competitive situations. Croson
and Gneezy (2009) provide an excellent summary of this literature. Overall, gender
differences in competitive behavior have been observed in a variety of settings and at
different ages.
Recently, a number of potential explanations have been proposed. For example,
Shurchkov (2012) and Gu¨nther et al. (2010) suggest task stereotypes and time constraints
as possible drivers. Women may under-perform in high-pressure situations and when time
is limited. Related to that hypothesis, Cotton et al. (2013) find girls to close the per-
formance gap to boys in a repeated game, as the gender gap only emerges in the first
period.
A key question for policymakers then asks whether this heterogeneity is gender-
inherent, acquired in society (“social learning”), or dependant on particular situations.
Andersen et al. (2013) conduct a series of experiments to find that in both matrilineal
and patriarchal societies girls are equally competitive as boys until puberty. However,
in male-dominated cultures girls become less competitive thereafter. Booth and Nolen
(2012b) use the term “social learning” in this context. In what follows, our results confirm
the notion that performance differences may not be gender-inherent, but rather depend
on social environments.
2.2 Gender Differences in Risk Preferences
Finally, an equally well-developed stream of literature has analyzed gender differences in
risk preferences. Byrnes et al. (1999) summarize the corresponding literature, concluding
males to generally be less risk averse, but this gap seems to narrow over time. Nevertheless,
gender differences in risk preferences have consistently been shown in a variety of settings,
such as decisions about smoking and seat belt usage (Hersch, 1996) or financial investment
(Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015).
Closely related to the design of our study, De Roos and Sarafidis (2010) analyze risk
preferences by gender on the game show Deal or No Deal. Their results produce mixed
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evidence for the claim that females are more risk averse than males. Kelley and Lemke
(2015) note women and men appear to weigh subjective probabilities differently when
considering a gamble, using data from the game show Cash Cab. The closest predecessor
to our paper comes from Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016) who study risk preferences
in the Swedish edition of Jeopardy!. We will relate to their findings in detail in section
5. In general, several researchers have used data from game shows to analyze people’s
behavior (e.g., Gertner, 1993, Metrick, 1995, Levitt, 2004, Antonovics et al., 2005, or Post
et al., 2008).
2.3 Gender of Opponents
Recently, the gender of one’s competitors has been suggested as a potential driver of the
described gender differences in performance and risk preferences. This hypothesis has
mostly been tested in experimental studies, as it is difficult to find real-life competitive
situations where a) the gender of one’s opponent is randomly assigned, b) individual
outcomes are clearly observable, and c) a sizeable sample is available. In reality, people
are likely selecting into gender environments they are comfortable with.
In a series of seminal experimental studies, Alison Booth and Patrick Nolen find
girls and female college students to take on higher risks in single-gender environments
(Booth and Nolen, 2012a; Booth and Nolen, 2012b; Booth et al., 2014). Interestingly,
Datta Gupta et al. (2013) find that once women can choose the gender of their competi-
tors, their willingness to compete increases, but this does not fully explain the gender
gap.4
Although these results from experimental studies are powerful in randomizing the
gender of one’s opposition, it is difficult to draw generalizable conclusions from these.
External validity is one of the key critiques of experimental studies that usually have to
rely on relatively small sample sizes, in addition to artificial and many times diminished
4Other works relating to the willingness to compete are provided by Shurchkov (2012), Gneezy and
Pietrasz (2013), and Sutter and Gla¨tzle-Ru¨tzler (2014), among others.
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incentive structures. Antonovics et al. (2009) focus on the comparability of results ob-
tained from laboratory settings with real-life situations. They conclude that findings are
comparable when the offered stakes are high (above US$50) and when players are young
(under the age of 33). Note that a minimum payoff of US$50 can quickly become expen-
sive if a researcher would like a sizeable sample. Most experimental studies have found it
difficult to cross that payoff threshold (see Table 1).
As an alternative, some studies have used data from game shows. In particular,
Lindquist and Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh (2011) and Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016) use
data from the Swedish edition of Jeopardy! to analyze whether the opponents’ gender af-
fects women’s risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the experimental evidence described
above, they find women to take on less risk when competing against males. Overall, how-
ever, non-experimental studies to test the effect of the opponents’ gender on performance
and risk-taking have been scarce.
2.4 Jeopardy!
On September 10, 1984, Jeopardy! started its current run on television. Each episode
hosts three contestants and a maximum of 61 clues. Contrary to conventional game shows,
the Jeopardy! host, Alex Trebek, reads out ‘clues’ and whoever contestant pushes a buzzer
first has to pose the correct question to the ‘clue.’ In turn, whoever provides the correct
question to the clue is able to decide which clue will be selected next. Throughout the
paper, we will use the terminology of ‘responding’ to clues to facilitate readability. The
show consists of three rounds: Jeopardy!, Double Jeopardy!, and Final Jeopardy!.
The Jeopardy! round contains six categories of five clues each with values of US$200,
400, 600, 800, and 1,000. After that, the Double Jeopardy! round includes the same
number of clues (new categories), but twice the prize money.5 In each Jeopardy! round,
one Daily Double clue is hidden, whereas two are included in the Double Jeopardy! round.
5Before November 26, 2001, these values were US$100, 200, 300, 400, and 500. Similarly, the Double
Jeopardy! clues included values of US$200, 400, 600, 800, and 1,000.
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If a contestant happens to select a Daily Double clue, they are allowed to wager up to
their entire account balance or the largest dollar value on the current board, whichever
of the two is larger. If they respond correctly, they will gain the wagered sum, whereas
they will lose that sum if their response is incorrect. From a 2015 interview with the
head Jeopardy! writer, a Daily Double is “something that requires a little more thought,
requires a two-step process” relative to the other clues in the Jeopardy! and Double
Jeopardy! rounds (McCown, 2015). The Final Jeopardy! round consists of one single clue
in which all contestants can wager up to the total amount of their current account before
the clue is given, although the category is known in advance (Trebeck and Barsocchini,
1990, p.171-174).
The goal of the game is to finish the three rounds with the most money, as only
the player with the highest dollar score will receive that value in the form of cash and
be eligible to compete in the subsequent episode. The other two competitors receive
consolation prizes based on their relative rank, with a prize of higher dollar value for
second than third place (Trebeck and Barsocchini, 1990, p.57). As of May 16, 2002, the
prior physical consolation prizes were changed to cash prizes with second place receiving
US$2,000 and third place US$1,000 (Jeopardy!, 2015b).
Currently, the show ranks as the number two game show in syndication,6 averaging 25
million viewers per week (Jeopardy!, 2015d). The production staff employs six researchers
(currently two female and four male) and nine writers (currently two female and seven
male) who are in charge of creating and assembling clues for the show (Jeopardy!, 2015c).
The contestant selection process is initiated when interested individuals complete an online
exam of 50 clues. Since 2006, online testing has been possible, which has contributed to
expanding the contestant pool toward including more women, minorities, and students
(Jeopardy!, 2015d).7
6Meaning the show is available to be licensed to television affiliates without ties to a specific network.
7The online qualification exam is available here: http://www.jeopardy.com/beacontestant/
contestantsearches/practicetest/. Exams to be part of the show are offered periodically throughout
the year and results are valid for 12 months (Jeopardy!, 2015a). Prior to 2006, paper examinations were
given at various geographic locations throughout the United States.
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The show operates regular and tournament matches in four demographic categories:
kids (under the age of 13), teens (aged 13 – 17), adults (over age 18), and college students
(must be a full-time student and not have completed a bachelor’s degree). We access data
from the regular show featuring adults (90.3 percent of episodes), but all our results are
consistent when including the remaining categories. According to Trebeck and Barsoc-
chini (1990), approximately 250,000 people apply each year with 15,000 taking the first
qualification exam, 1,500 qualifying for the show, and 500 being on air. Thus, only 0.2
percent of the initial applicants are eventually selected. Based on the examinations as part
of the qualification process, contestants are “probably all equal in terms of knowledge”
(Trebeck and Barsocchini, 1990, p.61). Trebek states that ultimately it is a function of
the categories that are randomly selected for a given show that determines a winner. The
clues’ topics are drawn from general knowledge categories and our analysis will control
for the most common categories.
Our study is not the first to employ Jeopardy! data. Most notably, Metrick (1995)
analyzes 1,150 Final Jeopardy! round decisions from 1989 to 1992, estimating risk prefer-
ences. However, his focus is not on gender differences or gender composition of opponents.
He et al. (2008) use Daily Double wagering decisions, finding females to wager less than
males, even after having answered questions correctly before in that same category. Al-
though their study addresses potential gender differences in risk preferences, they, too, do
not focus on the gender of opponents. Finally, Lindquist and Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh (2011) and
Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016) use data from the Swedish edition of Jeopardy! to
analyze the effect of opponents’ gender on girls’ and women’s risk preferences in Daily
Double clues.
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3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data Description
As of June 5, 2015, the J! Archive website, a fan-created archive of Jeopardy! episodes,
contains full information for 4,279 complete episodes, including 8,169 players and 254,079
clues. Employing a data specialist, we extracted all information of all available episodes.
While the dataset is extensive, it does not include all Jeopardy! episodes. In fact, recent
seasons contain information on every episode (since January 5, 2004), but earlier seasons
often have missing episodes on the website. However, if an episode is present, all corre-
sponding information is available. After checking the episode numbers and available data,
we do not find evidence of systematic omissions from the archive. Nevertheless, limiting
the sample to the episodes #4,451 to #7,084 (since January 5, 2004), where the data
exhibits no gaps, produces consistent findings. The corresponding results are available in
Tables AII to AIV.
For every clue given, the website contains information about the three contestants’ full
names, their accumulated prize money, the category of the clue, and the sequence of clues.
Most importantly, the first name of each contestant allows us to conjecture their gender.
In most cases, names are commonly attributable to a gender (e.g., Frank and Adam
are male; Alison and Alyssa are female) and in those cases where names could indicate
either a female or a male contestant, a Google search for the full name readily produces a
picture of the Jeopardy! contestant. The same follows if names are abbreviated (e.g., A.C.
Hawley). This strategy allows us to allocate a binary indicator for female contestants to
all of the 8,169 contestants.
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3.2 Four Scenarios of Study
Throughout the analysis, we focus on four distinct competitive scenarios occurring with
the Jeopardy! and Double Jeopardy! rounds.8 First, we consider each contestant’s prob-
ability to answer a clue. Thus, for each clue we obtain three data points (one for each
contestant), producing a total sample size of 749,433 observations. Second, once a can-
didate taps the buzzer we evaluate the probability of responding correctly. Note that
if the answer is incorrect opponents can choose whether they wish to answer the clue.
Thus, clues could be answered by zero (nobody chooses to respond), one, two, or all three
contestants (if given answers continue to be incorrect). This second scenario produces a
sample of 248,052 observations.
Third, we analyze performances in particularly high-stakes situations: responding to
Daily Double clues. In these clues, stakes (as wagered by the respective contestant)
average US$1,922, whereas the average stakes in a regular clue come out to be US$711.
Overall, this produces a sample of 12,615 observations. Fourth and final, we analyze
the wagering decision in these Daily Double scenarios. Specifically, we divide the chosen
wager by the maximum possible wager to estimate what percentage of the allowed sum is
wagered (akin to Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist, 2016). Everything else equal, a higher
percentage indicates higher stakes and therefore higher risks.
Table 2 displays the dependent variables of all four scenarios by gender. At first glance,
we observe no overall gender differences in the probabilities to respond or to respond
correctly. However, women choose to wager less than men in Daily Double situations (45.2
percent of their available maximum, compared to 47.5 percent). These basic statistics are
consistent with benchmark results from numerous studies, suggesting women to be more
risk-averse than men (e.g., Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015).
8We exclude Final Jeopardy! rounds, as all contestants naturally respond to that clue. In addition,
wagering decisions in the Final Jeopardy! round can follow a number of different strategies, depending
on the account balances of all contestants (see Metrick, 1995).
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Table 2: Summary statistics by gender.




Answering 0.331 0.331 0.754
(299,555) (449,878)
Answering correctly 0.855 0.853 0.457
(99,211) (148,841)
Answering correctly to Daily Double clue 0.637 0.649 0.174
(5,010) (7,605)
Wager in Daily Double as % of maximum 0.452 0.475 0.000***
(5,010) (7,605)
3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Gender Composition
Figure 1 focuses on the females in all four settings and the gender composition of their
opponents. A woman rarely competes against two other women, whereas in about half
of the observations she competes against two males. Throughout our analysis, we will
consider the mixed opposition (one female, one male opponent) as the reference point.
Nevertheless, whichever category forms the reference group, our results are consistent in
highlighting the importance of a woman competing against two males.
Table 3 displays the four respective performance indicators when women compete
against two males, compared to any other gender composition (female/male and fe-
male/female). Women are performing better in all three performance measures and are
taking higher risks when competing against males only. Nevertheless, these basic descrip-
tive statistics should of course be considered with care. It is possible that confounding
factors are driving these differences, such as the category of the clue, previous perfor-
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Answering correctly, N = 99,211

















Daily Double, N = 5,010
2 male opponents 1 male & 1 female opponent
2 female opponents
Figure 1: Gender composition of the opposition for all females in the sample.
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Table 3: Summary statistics of females by gender of the opposition.
(1) (2) (1) = (2)




Answering 0.338 0.324 0.000***
(150,322) (149,233)
Answering correctly 0.857 0.852 0.016**
(50,850) (48,361)
Answering correctly to Daily Double clue 0.658 0.616 0.002***
(2,527) (2,483)
Wager in Daily Double as % of maximum 0.465 0.440 0.004***
(2,527) (2,483)
3.4 Control Variables
Given the information provided on the J! Archive website, we control for a number of
potentially confounding factors in all four scenarios. In particular, we incorporate binary
indicators for STEM clues (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), the 20
most frequent categories on the show, the dollar value of the clue, the account balance of
the contestant (both individual and relative to their opponents), the clue number in the
current round, a binary indicator for the Double Jeopardy! round, an indicator whether
the respondent has answered a clue incorrectly before, and year fixed effects.9 In addi-
tion, we incorporate player fixed effects, therefore relying on within-player variation only.
We now briefly discuss the relevance of each factor in estimating our four performance
indicators.
9We browsed all categories, manually sorting categories into STEM and non-STEM. The 20 most
common categories are science, before & after, literature, potpourri, American history, world history,
sports, business & industry, world geography, U.S. cities, colleges & universities, animals, transportation,
religion, U.S. geography, opera, authors, people, food, and the Bible. In alternative estimations, we
also use time trends (linear and squared) on the daily level, but the corresponding results are virtually
identical.
15
First, research has shown that women tend to opt out of STEM subjects in school
and are less likely to pursue STEM-related degrees at University (Preston, 1994; Mont-
marquette et al., 2002; Griffith, 2010; Grove et al., 2011). Thus, whether a clue can be
categorized as STEM may influence performance indicators differently by gender. In gen-
eral, it is possible that some categories are generally preferred by either gender and our
analysis includes binary indicators for the 20 most common categories. Second, a line of
research focuses on the size of an expected payoff, which relates to the dollar value of the
clue. A priori, large stakes could lead to increased or decreased performance levels, as the
related literature has produced evidence for both. For example, Lazear (2000) suggests
higher expected payoffs to raise effort levels and performance. In contrast, Ariely et al.
(2009) find that large expected payoffs can lead someone to “choke” and under-perform.
Thus, including the stakes of the clue may constitute a valuable performance indicator.
In addition, the Jeopardy! outline proposes that the degree of difficulty increases with
the associated dollar value (Provencher, 2011).
Third, although Jeopardy! participants are “probably all equal in terms of knowledge,”
according to the host of the show (Trebeck and Barsocchini, 1990, p.61), differences
in ability are likely present among the participants. Thus, we incorporate the current
account balance of the respective participant into the regression analysis. This variable
may not only reflect the contestant’s capabilities with respect to Jeopardy!, but also their
degree of confidence in the ongoing show. In addition, to capture the relative standing
of a player, we incorporate a variable relating one’s current account balance to their
opponents’. This caters to the notion that prior performance of competitors may influence
behavior in competitive tasks (Smith, 2013, produces evidence from spelling bee contests).
To retain all possible observations, we choose an additive formula: 2 × own balance −
balance1− balance2, where subscripts denote opponents. Note that putting one’s score in
percentage terms or any other division-based formula would eliminate observations where
the denominator is zero. In addition, it could skew observations where the numerator
16
takes on the value of zero. Nevertheless, all derived results are unaffected by choosing
other relative performance indicators.
Fourth, we incorporate a variable capturing whether a contestant has responded incor-
rectly to a clue before, relating to the same concept. All results are robust when including
a binary indicator for whether a contestant has responded correctly before, following Post
et al. (2008) and He et al. (2008). The corresponding results are referred to Tables AII
to AIV.
Fifth, to acknowledge the surrounding characteristics of each clue, we add variables
describing the number of the clue in the ongoing round and a binary indicator for the
Double Jeopardy! round, where dollar values of all clues are doubled. Both parameters
can relate to the accumulated experience of the contestants within the game and previous
research has shown that gender differences may disappear in repeated competition (e.g.,
see Cotton et al., 2013). If such dynamics could indeed affect women’s performance
differently than men’s, then coefficients on gender-related regressors may be biased if
such a variable is not captured.
Sixth, we include year fixed effects. Figure 2 visualizes the share of female contestants
over time, as well as the fraction of shows that feature one female against two males.
Note that, although the participation of women has fluctuated from around 22 percent to
almost 50 percent, we observe more women in the show since 2006, when online testing
has been introduced (see section 2.4 for details). As for gender composition of the show,
the 1-female-2-males combination has been especially prominent in the first year of the
show and has since fluctuated between 40 percent and over 70 percent. A number of
factors could have driven these developments over time and we wish to ensure that no
time-specific unobservables are influencing our analysis. Note that year fixed effects also
control for the mentioned doubling of prize money at the end of 2001.
Finally, in an extension discussed in section 4.5 we further incorporate player fixed
effects, thereby relying on within-player variation only. Detailed summary statistics of all
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Figure 2: Share of female contestants over time (left) and share of shows with one female
contestant (right).
3.5 Methodology
Our econometric strategy follows standard regression methodologies in the associated
literature. To analyze probabilities of responding and responding correctly, we first apply a
conventional logit regression framework, clustering errors on the player level. Throughout
our analysis, we will display marginal effects of all associated coefficients to facilitate
interpretation. Nevertheless, all our results are robust when applying a probit framework
and are referred to Tables AII to AIV. To incorporate unobservable characteristics of each
individual player, such as individual ability, we then move to a fixed effects framework.
Our analysis of wagering decisions applies an OLS framework, again clustering errors
on the player level. Throughout all our estimations, we focus on the coefficients of interest,
although detailed results of the control variables are displayed in Tables AII to AIV.
4 Empirical Findings
Tables 4 through 7 display regression results for all four performance indicators. In each
Table, columns (1) and (2) analyze the full sample, checking for basic gender differences.
Columns (3) and (4) focus on the female subsample, distinguishing between the gender
composition of their opponents. Further, we form subsamples including all males and dis-
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tinguishing women by the gender of their opponents. Column (7) of each Table concludes
with an estimation of the full sample, including a binary term for females who happen to
compete against two males. Finally, Tables 8 and 9 present our results from incorporating
player fixed effects.
4.1 Answering
We begin by analyzing the probability to respond to a clue. Note that, in the context
of competitive behavior, responding could reflect the pure choice to respond, but it may
also involve the quickness with which a contestant hits the buzzer following the prompt.
Note that the prompt to respond is made available only after the full clue has been
read (Trebeck and Barsocchini, 1990, p. 58-60). Thus, even though a contestant may
want to respond, they may not get to do so if an opponent is faster to tap the buzzer
after responses are allowed. Nevertheless, both explanations (speed and knowledge) can
arguably be considered as behavior in a competitive situation.
Table 4 displays the corresponding results from logit regressions, estimating the prob-
ability that a contestant responds to a clue. Consistent with the raw descriptive statistics
displayed in Table 2, we observe no gender differences in the probability to respond, even
after including all control variables. Women are as likely as men to respond to a given
Jeopardy! clue.
Columns (3) and (4) focus on the females in our sample, testing whether the gender
composition of their contestants matters in their propensity to respond. Indeed, substan-
tial heterogeneity emerges. If women compete against men only, they are more likely
to respond, compared to the scenario where at least one other woman forms part of the
group. This result is statistically significant on the one percent level. Column (4) fur-
ther introduces a binary indicator for a single-sex environment (only females), but the
result related to an all-male composition of opponents remains unchanged. Thus, the ab-
sence of women increases the likelihood of a woman to respond. In terms of magnitude,
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Table 4: Dependent variable is whether contestant responds. Displaying marginal effects
from logit regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Females only Subsamplesb Full Sample
Female 0.000 -0.000 0.004∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes yes yes
2 male opponents 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
2 female opponents 0.001
(0.005)
Female × 2 male 0.009∗∗∗
opponents (0.002)
# of players 8,169 8,169 3,726 3,726 6,731 6,326 8,169
% female players 39.97 39.97 100 100 25.04 24.91 39.97
N 749,433 749,433 299,555 299,555 600,200 599,111 749,433
Log lik. -475,797 -471,953 -188,446 -188,446 -378,544 -376,791 -471,938
Notes: Standard errors clustered on the player level displayed in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes binary indicators for STEM clues and the 20 most common categories, the $ value of the clue, the account
balance of the contestant (both individual and relative to their opponents), the clue number in the current round, a binary
indicator for the Double Jeopardy! round, an indicator whether the respondent has answered a clue incorrectly before, and
year fixed effects. bColumn (5) includes all males and those females who compete against 2 males. Column (6) includes all
males and those females who compete against 1 or 2 females.
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women are one percentage point more likely to respond when competing against males
only, compared to competing against at least one other woman.
Moving to columns (5) and (6), we consider two distinct subsamples to analyze how
much the gender of a woman’s opponents influences her performance. Specifically, we
exploit the random assignment of all contestants into competition with people from either
gender. Column (5) forms a subsample including all males and those females who happen
to compete against two males. Indeed, the results show a woman’s likelihood of responding
is actually higher than a man’s, as soon as she is competing against two males.
Column (6) considers a subsample of males and only those females who happen to
compete against at least one other woman. In this case, a woman is 0.5 percentage points
less likely to respond than an average man and the gender gap emerges with force. This
result is statistically significant on the one percent level.
Finally, column (7) returns to using the full sample, introducing a term that takes on
the value of one if a female competes against two males. The pure gender coefficient is
now negative, statistically significant on the one percent level, and indicates women to
be five percentage points less likely to respond. However, when a woman competes in an
otherwise all-male environment, the net effect turns to +0.004 (-0.005 plus 0.009) and the
overall statistical effect is undistinguishable from zero.
In sum, Table 4 produces clear differences in a woman’s probability to respond to a
Jeopardy! clue, depending on the gender of her opposition. A woman’s performance,
measured as the probability to respond, improves significantly when competing against
two males.
4.2 Answering Correctly
After the probability of responding, we now evaluate the performance of Jeopardy! contes-
tants in answering clues correctly. Thus, this sample considers those 248,052 observations
where the respective contestant chose to respond, with the corresponding results displayed
in Table 5. As in the first scenario, we find no basic gender differences in the probability
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to respond correctly in columns (1) and (2), even after the inclusion of the comprehensive
set of control variables. However, women once again fare better when competing against
males only. In this case, women are 0.4 percentage points more likely to answer correctly
– a result that is statistically relevant on the ten percent level.
Table 5: Dependent variable is whether contestant responds correctly. Displaying
marginal effects from logit regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Females only Subsamplesb Full Sample
Female 0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes yes yes
2 male opponents 0.004∗ 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002)
2 female opponents -0.002
(0.005)
Female × 2 male 0.004∗
opponents (0.002)
# of players 8,169 8,169 3,726 3,726 6,731 6,326 8,169
% female players 39.97 39.97 100 100 25.04 24.91 39.97
N 248,052 248,052 99,211 99,211 199,691 197,202 248,052
Log lik. -103,149 -100,662 -40,180 -40,180 -80,859 -80,250 -100,660
Notes: Standard errors clustered on the player level displayed in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes binary indicators for STEM clues and the 20 most common categories, the $ value of the clue, the account
balance of the contestant (both individual and relative to their opponents), the clue number in the current round, a binary
indicator for the Double Jeopardy! round, an indicator whether the respondent has answered a clue incorrectly before, and
year fixed effects. bColumn (5) includes all males and those females who compete against 2 males. Column (6) includes all
males and those females who compete against 1 or 2 females.
Columns (5) and (6) consider the familiar subsamples, first analyzing a sample of men
and those women with male-only competition. Here again, we find no statistically relevant
difference between males and females – if anything, women are more likely to respond
correctly. However, a woman’s probability of responding correctly decreases as soon as
other women are competing, although the corresponding coefficient is not statistically
significant on conventional levels. Overall, the same trend from Table 4 is maintained.
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Finally, column (7) returns to the full sample and, similar to the results from Table
4, highlights that gender composition matters for women. Generally, a woman is 0.2
percentage points less likely to respond correctly, although this effect is not significant
on conventional levels of statistical relevance. In turn, her performance improves when
competing against men only.
4.3 Answering Correctly in Daily Double Clues
The third setting aimed at analyzing performance focuses on Daily Double clues. We
choose these situations because the expected payoffs are substantially elevated, compared
to the average Jeopardy! clue. Throughout our sample, the wagered value of Daily Double
clues averages US$1,922 as opposed to US$711 in a regular clue.10
Table 6 displays results from estimating the probability to respond correctly to these
high-stakes clues. In the full sample, females are marginally less likely to respond correctly,
a result that is consistent with previous findings in the associated literature (Gneezy et al.,
2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010). Nevertheless, the
coefficient is not significant on conventional levels of statistical relevance.
Gender composition continues to play a decisive role, as women are three percentage
points more likely to respond correctly when paired against males (columns 3 and 4).
Further, column (5) shows that the gender performance gap in high-stakes situations
disappears if a woman is randomly assigned to compete against men only. In fact, the
coefficient on female turns positive. However, when comparing men’s performance to
those women who happen to compete against at least one other female, the gender gap
emerges with force: women are 2.7 percentage points less likely to respond correctly.
Once again, the presence of other women seems to notably diminish the performance of
a woman.
Column (7) reiterates these findings in the full sample. In general, women are 2.8
percentage points less likely to respond correctly in high-stakes clues, compared to men.
10The median value of Daily Double clues is US$1,500, as opposed to US$600 for regular clues.
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Table 6: Dependent variable is whether contestant responds correctly to Daily Double
clue. Displaying marginal effects from logit regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Females only Subsamplesb Full Sample
Female -0.012 -0.012 0.005 -0.027∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes yes yes
2 male opponents 0.032∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
2 female opponents -0.013
(0.033)
Female × 2 male 0.033∗∗
opponents (0.013)
# of players 6,075 6,075 2,683 2,683 4,967 4,780 6,075
% female players 44.16 44.16 100 100 31.69 29.02 44.16
N 12,615 12,615 5,010 5,010 10,132 10,088 12,615
Log lik. -8,209 -8,067 -3,189 -3,189 -6,435 -6,468 -8,064
Notes: Standard errors clustered on the player level displayed in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes binary indicators for STEM clues and the 20 most common categories, the $ value of the clue, the account
balance of the contestant (both individual and relative to their opponents), the clue number in the current round, a binary
indicator for the Double Jeopardy! round, an indicator whether the respondent has answered a clue incorrectly before, and
year fixed effects. bColumn (5) includes all males and those females who compete against 2 males. Column (6) includes all
males and those females who compete against 1 or 2 females.
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However, that difference disappears once a woman competes in an otherwise all-male
environment.
4.4 Wagering in Daily Double Clues
Our final setting studies the wagering behavior of contestants who happen to choose a
Daily Double clue. Based on a number of previous findings (e.g., Byrnes et al., 1999;
Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn, 2015), we would expect women to be more risk-averse than men
in their wagering decisions. Indeed, columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 firmly support this
notion. On average, a woman wagers 1.5 percentage points less of her available maximum
betting amount than men, once the familiar control variables are accounted for.
Table 7: Results from OLS regressions estimating the share of maximum wager in Daily
Double clue.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Females only Subsamplesb Full Sample
Female -0.022∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes yes yes
2 male opponents 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
2 female opponents -0.009
(0.015)
Female × 2 male 0.037∗∗∗
opponents (0.006)
# of players 6,075 6,075 2,682 2,682 4,967 4,779 6,075
% female players 44.16 44.16 100 100 31.69 29.02 44.16
N 12,615 12,615 5,010 5,010 10,132 10,088 12,615
Notes: Standard errors clustered on the player level displayed in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes binary indicators for STEM clues and the 20 most common categories, the $ value of the clue, the account
balance of the contestant (both individual and relative to their opponents), the clue number in the current round, a binary
indicator for the Double Jeopardy! round, an indicator whether the respondent has answered a clue incorrectly before, and
year fixed effects. bColumn (5) includes all males and those females who compete against 2 males. Column (6) includes all
males and those females who compete against 1 or 2 females.
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Once we consider differences among women, depending on the gender of their com-
petitors, we find the same heterogeneity as in the previous settings. Women are wagering
considerably more in an otherwise all-male environment. Further, columns (5) and (6) re-
veal how important the role of gender composition really is: if a woman competes against
men only, her risk-taking behavior is not in any way distinguishable from that of men.
In fact, the respective coefficient even turns positive, hinting at women potentially tak-
ing higher risks than men when competing against an all-male field. Nevertheless, the
corresponding coefficient remains far from conventional levels of statistical importance.
Contrary to that, column (6) paints a different picture. In a sample of males and only
those females who happen to compete against at least one other female, the gender gap in
risk preferences emerges with force. In this case, the gap increases to over twice the initial
size in column (2) and women wager 3.3 percentage points less than men, on average.
Finally, column (7) displays results from analyzing the full sample. Consistent with
the previous findings, no gender gap emerges if a woman competes against two males, as
the net effect of being female in that situation reaches a value of +0.004. If anything, the
results in Table 6 are stronger in qualitative and quantitative terms than those for the
previous scenarios of responding and responding correctly. Thus, gender composition of
a woman’s competitors may substantially influence her risk-taking behavior.
4.5 Including Player Fixed Effects
Up to now, our analysis relies on variation within and across contestants in a pooled
setting. However, although we incorporate a number of potentially confounding factors
and errors are clustered on the player level, individual particularities could drive our
findings. For instance, Jeopardy! producers may be able to identify promising candidates
beforehand and then choose promising female candidates to compete against two males.
None of our readings about the show would suggest this, but it is also likely that producers
would not openly admit to such a strategy. In general, unobservable characteristics on
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the individual level may differ between those women who compete against two males and
the remaining female candidates.
To alleviate such concerns, we now move to a fixed effects framework. These regressions
only exploit within-player variation, therefore controlling for any individual heterogeneity.
In other words, the derived coefficient for women with two male opponents only reflects
information from those females who have competed against two males and against at least
one female in another episode. By design, such fixed effects estimations are difficult to
conduct and interpret in a logit or probit framework (Greene, 2004), and the literature
then usually moves to the more conventional strategy of employing OLS frameworks.
Thus, for our first three settings of binary outcome variables, we first replicate the
most complete estimation (column 7 of each respective Table) in an OLS model to see
whether results are comparable. Then, we employ the fixed effects framework. (Note that
the pure gender variable becomes obsolete in a fixed effects framework.) Table 8 displays
the corresponding findings from analyzing the probabilities to answer (columns 1 to 3)
and to answer correctly (columns 4 to 6). The first respective column simply replicates
the most complete logit regression, before moving to a pooled OLS framework and then
to including fixed effects.
First, notice that the OLS analyses in columns (2) and (5) closely replicate the results
from logit regressions. Incorporating fixed effects then produces telling results, as the
derived coefficients for the variable of interest are confirmed in their statistical importance.
In fact, the respective magnitudes are even increased. For the decision to respond, the
regression produces a coefficient of 0.011 – marginally higher than the pooled estimation
(0.010). Similarly, when estimating correct responses the coefficient more than doubles
from 0.004 to 0.009. Thus, if anything, unobservable characteristics have produced a
downward bias of the effect of the opponents’ gender on women’s performance.
Table 9 moves to scenarios three and four, focusing on Daily Double clues. When
estimating performance, the OLS methodology again produces virtually identical coef-
ficients. As before, incorporating fixed effects substantially increases the coefficient of
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Table 8: Results from fixed effects regressions estimating whether contestant responds
(columns 1 – 3) and responds correctly (columns 4 – 6). Logit regressions
display marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Answering Answering correctly
Estimation method: Logit OLS OLS Logit OLS OLS
Female -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female × 2 male 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗ 0.009∗
opponents (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes yes yes
Player fixed effects yes yes
# of players 8,169 8,169 8,169 8,169 8,169 8,169
% female players 39.97 39.97 39.97 39.97 39.97 39.97
N 749,433 749,433 749,433 248,052 248,052 248,052
Log lik. -471,938 -100,660
Notes: Standard errors clustered on the player level displayed in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes binary indicators for STEM clues and the 20 most common categories, the $ value of the clue, the account
balance of the contestant (both individual and relative to their opponents), the clue number in the current round, a binary
indicator for the Double Jeopardy! round, year fixed effects, and an indicator for whether the respondent has answered a
clue incorrectly before.
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interest (from 0.033 to 0.047), as competing against two males again improves women’s
performance. However, the derived coefficient is not significantly different from zero in
column (3). Note that standard errors are more than doubled when fixed effects are em-
ployed, indicating a much more restrictive estimation. Thus, it is possible that the fixed
effects framework does not leave enough variation to reveal potential differences along the
lines of gender composition.
Table 9: Results from fixed effects regressions estimating whether contestant responds
correctly to Daily Double clue (columns 1 – 3) and the wagering amount in Daily
Double clues (columns 4 and 5). Logit regressions display marginal effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Answering correctly in DD Wagering decision in DD
Estimation method: Logit OLS OLS OLS OLS
Female -0.029∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.005)
Female × 2 male 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.047 0.037∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
opponents (0.013) (0.014) (0.031) (0.006) (0.016)
Control variablesa yes yes yes yes yes
Player fixed effects yes yes
# of players 6,075 6,075 6,075 6,075 6,075
% female players 44.16 44.16 44.16 44.16 44.16
N 12,615 12,615 12,615 12,615 12,615
Log lik. -8,064
Notes: Standard errors clustered on the player level displayed in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
aIncludes binary indicators for STEM clues and the 20 most common categories, the $ value of the clue, the account
balance of the contestant (both individual and relative to their opponents), the clue number in the current round, a binary
indicator for the Double Jeopardy! round, year fixed effects, and an indicator for whether the respondent has answered a
clue incorrectly before.
Finally, column (4) reproduces the most complete OLS regression estimating wagering
decisions. When moving to a fixed effects framework, the familiar result is recovered and
women are willing to take on higher risks when competing against males. Here again,
the derived coefficient gains in magnitude, this time from 0.037 to 0.051. Note that this
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coefficient is estimated with much more statistical precision (significant on the one percent
level), even though standard errors are again elevated compared to the pooled regression
(almost tripled from 0.006 to 0.016).
Overall, these results from implementing fixed effects regressions strongly confirm our
baseline findings. Female Jeopardy! contestants perform better and take on higher risks
when competing against two males, even when relying on within-player variation only.
Further robustness checks are referred to the appendix Tables AII to AV.
5 Discussion
Our findings are surprising, as they stand in stark contrast to the closest predecessors.
Related to risk preferences, Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016) find women to wager
less when competing against males in the Swedish edition of Jeopardy!.11 We find the
opposite and it is worthwhile to compare the two setups to identify potential reasons why
results are so different.
First, Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016) analyze data from Sweden, whereas our
data is derived from the US.12 Differences across countries in the effect of the opponents’
gender on performance and risk-taking behavior have previously been identified. For
example, Ca´rdenas et al. (2012) find substantial differences across Colombian and Swedish
schoolgirls. Their findings indicate no gender gap in Colombia, whereas Swedish girls are,
in fact, more competitive in some tasks than boys. In another study, Andersen et al.
(2013) find differences between matrilineal and patriarchal societies in how females (after
puberty) compete. In general, cross-country differences in the role of women have been
identified across a wide range of studies, potentially owed to religion, culture, or other
factors. Thus, our results may simply differ from Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016)
because we analyze a US sample and they study a Swedish sample. In addition, although
11Other studies conform to these findings (e.g., Booth and Nolen, 2012b; Booth et al., 2014), although
most of the evidence is derived for school kids or first-year college students.
12Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016) also discuss this explanation in their literature review.
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speculative at this point, it is likely that the Swedish sample is much more homogeneous
than the US sample, given the vast ethnic diversity in the US population.
Second, the US edition of Jeopardy!, with its long history, allows us to analyze a much
larger sample than the Swedish edition. In fact, our sample is almost 15 times larger than
the sample from Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016) with 8,169 versus 556 contestants.
When relating the number of observations for the study of risk preferences, our sample is
over 22 times larger (12,615 versus 556). In fact, Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016)
are able to incorporate only 35 Daily Double clues where a woman competes against two
men. Our analysis produces 2,527 such observations. Sample sizes from the relevant
experimental studies are noticeably smaller still (see Table 1). Thus, the remarkable
consistency with which we find women to compete better when paired against men may
emerge in large sample sizes, as outliers may drive results in smaller samples.
Third, our rich data set allows for the inclusion of additional control variables that are
absent from Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016). Most importantly, we control for the
20 most prominent question categories (e.g., STEM), but also the score of the contestant
relative to their opponents, year fixed effects, and the question number in the current
episode. Basic gender differences have been pointed out along several of these dimensions
by other studies, such as selection into STEM categories in education, a potential learning
effect in competitive environments by women and so on.
Fourth and most importantly, the large US sample allows us to estimate performance
and risk attitudes in a fixed-effects framework. In other words, we are able to control
for any remaining individual heterogeneity along the lines of education, any other sorts
of individual Jeopardy! -relevant knowledge, and respective behavioral patterns. This al-
leviates concerns about a potential selection bias, as those women assigned to compete
against two males may, a priori, simply be better at the game of Jeopardy!.
In summary, our analysis differs along several dimensions from the closest predecessor
by Sa¨ve-So¨derbergh and Lindquist (2016). The fact that results differ substantially should
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encourage further research into whether the opponents’ gender is able to explain gender
differences in performance and risk-taking.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes a rich database of 4,279 Jeopardy! episodes with 8,169 contestants to
study gender differences in performance and risk preferences. Being unable to choose the
gender of their opponents, this setting proves ideal to study whether the gender of females’
opponents affects their behavior in a highly competitive situation with large stakes.
We study four distinct scenarios: the likelihood of responding, responding correctly,
and responding correctly in particularly high-stakes situations (Daily Double clues); and
wagering decisions in Daily Double situations. Along all performance dimensions, a
woman fares significantly better when paired against males and the gender gap disap-
pears. Even the substantial gender gap in risk preferences vanishes completely when a
woman is competing against two males. These results are robust to the inclusion of a
number of control variables and alternative estimations. In addition, these findings are
confirmed when player fixed effects are included, thereby exploiting within-player varia-
tion only.
Our findings relate to several areas of policymaking. First, gender separation in educa-
tion may lead to under-performance and more risk aversion among females. Second, some
occupations continue to be highly gender-specific. As an example, Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn
(2015) suggest that a higher share of women in finance may alleviate risk taking. Our
conclusions imply that inserting one woman into an all-male environment may not evoke
risk aversion. Rather, she may adapt to males’ behavior. However, integrating more
women in such work environments may indeed produce more risk aversion among women.
Given the setup of our study (Jeopardy! always features three contestants), we cannot
evaluate at which exact gender ratio the differences emerge. This provides a promising
area of future studies. Finally, in a more general context, our results support the idea
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that gender differences in performance and risk preferences depend on social environments
(specifically the gender of the opposition), rather than gender-inherent particularities.
Of course, it is possible that Jeopardy! contestants are not necessarily representative
of the entire population. Nevertheless, the strength with which our results emerge in such
a large sample hints at a general importance of gender composition in explaining gender
gaps in performance and risk preferences. Women may perform better and take on higher
risks when competing against men.
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Appendix
Table AI: Summary statistics of control variables by gender.




Panel A: Answering (N = 749,433)
STEM 0.056 0.056 0.416
$ value of clue 740 718 0.000***
Score 3,996 3,862 0.000***
Relative score 150 -100 0.000***
Missed clue before 0.622 0.616 0.000***
Panel B: Answering correctly (N = 248,052)
STEM 0.057 0.056 0.557
$ value of clue 713 692 0.000***
Score 4,299 4,110 0.000***
Relative score 1,270 896 0.000***
Missed clued before 0.618 0.616 0.275
Panel C: Daily Double clues (N = 12,615)
STEM 0.064 0.071 0.117
$ value of clue 1,045 1,013 0.000***
Score 6,121 5,770 0.000***
Relative score 3,293 2,834 0.001***
Missed clued before 0.704 0.701 0.694
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